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JOHN GARANG AND SUDANISM: A PECULIAR AND RESILIENT 
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
By Matthew J. Delaney
Perspectives
Dialogue about John Garang and his Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Move-
ment (SPLA/M) usually falls into two separate camps. One camp includes 
many who tend to perceive Garang as a militaristic, power-hungry, dictatorial 
leader who was not as concerned with democracy as he had claimed. Scholars 
such as Sarah Hutchinson, Jok Madut Jok, John Young, Claire Metelits, Alex 
de Waal, and Oystein H. Rolandsen discredit aspects of Garang’s movement 
and ideology because of his human rights abuses and inability to implement 
effective civil administrations in southern Sudan.
Mansour Khalid is of the second camp, and he most overtly supports 
John Garang’s leadership and nationalist agenda. Abel Alier, M.W. Daly, and 
Douglas Johnson also tend to sympathize with Garang and credit him with 
having achieved effective civil administrations in the southern Sudan. They 
perceive his democratic goals as mostly genuine, but they do not deny his 
human rights abuses. However, they tend to address his autocratic behavior 
objectively by trying to understand it in the context of the SPLA/M’s violent 
and propagandistic opposition in Khartoum and among factions in the South.
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Francis M. Deng remains relatively neutral with regard to Garang’s suc-
cess as a politician and as a defender of democracy. Garang plays a small 
role in Deng’s argument that Sudan’s conflict since independence has been 
a conflict of identity between the largely Arab north and the mostly African 
south. Deng claims that long term peace in Sudan will not be realized until 
the problem of the Sudanese identity is resolved. My exposition of Garang’s 
nationalist ideology, Sudanism, is in agreement with Deng’s thesis, which is 
that Sudan’s conflict is identity-driven.1 The purpose of this paper is to explain 
Garang’s perspective of the Sudanese identity, which is embodied in his na-
tionalist ideology, “Sudanism.”
Introduction
You, the people, in your popular uprising succeeded in cutting 
off the monster’s head but the lifeless body continues to deceive 
you that the monster is still dangerous. No, It is not!  Having cut 
off the monster’s head, it is your sacred duty to push down the 
monster’s body, not stand in fear of it.2
These are the zealous words of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Commander-
in-Chief of the SPLA/M, in April of 1985. He was addressing the people of 
Sudan after a recent popular people’s uprising, which overthrew the Presi-
dent of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri. Nimeiri was a voracious despot who was the 
embodiment of the “monster’s head” in the opening quote. Garang did not 
only necessitate the removal of the monster’s head, but also the destruction 
of the body. The monster’s body is Nimeirism, which is a term that describes 
the various policies and dictatorial, exploitative actions of President Nimeiri. 
Nimeirism is a model of oppression against which John Garang pitted his ef-
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forts of liberation. In defiance of Nimeirism, Garang offered a new nationalist 
ideology, which he called Sudanism, and which recognized the ethnic, cul-
tural, and religious diversity of Sudan and called for a new, uniquely Sudanese 
identity.3 Garang’s Sudanism was therefore inherently opposed to divisiveness 
and separatism, and was disposed to unity. This thesis examines the conflicts 
between Sudanism and Nimeirism, and Sudanism and secessionism in the 
context of the second civil war in Sudan starting in 1983. In the following 
pages I will argue that Garang remained consistent and persistent in herald-
ing a new, united Sudan based on Sudanism, which was at heart a nationalist 
ideology. Using James L. Gelvin’s model of the development and nature of 
nationalisms I will demonstrate that Garang’s Sudanism was a peculiar form 
of nationalism.4 I will describe his nationalist ideology in contrast to Nimeir-
ism and secessionism.
NIMEIRISM VERSUS SUDANISM
John Garang defined Nimeirism as a policy of divide and rule that oppressed 
the people of Sudan.5 He said that “the oppressor has divided the Sudanese 
people into Northerners and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners...Mus-
lims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans.”6 According to Garang, 
separatism, or sentiments among Southerners that called for secession from 
the North, was a result of oppressive divide-and-rule tactics by the ruling elite. 
The divisions reflected by the Nimeiri regime were meant to weaken the “just 
cause” of the Sudanese people. Nimeiri had perpetuated the “neo-colonial 
system” in which a “few people had amassed great wealth at the expense of 
the majority;” the “few” being those of the “minority clique regime.”7 Garang 
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formally listed Nimeiri’s offenses against the Sudanese people and condemned 
him for corruption, bribery, resource exploitation, and other forms of subju-
gation.8 Garang’s cardinal theme was that Nimeiri exploited and neglected 
all Sudanese outside of the oligarchy of the Arab ruling elite with policies of 
divide and rule, and by abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended 
the first civil war in Sudan in 1972. He points out that Nimeiri wanted to 
“deprive the South of mineral rich or prime agricultural land.”9 Garang boldly 
condemned this resource exploitation and said that “natural resources, wher-
ever they are found in the Sudan, belong to the whole Sudanese people.”10 
This is readily applicable to the case of the Jonglei Canal, in which Khartoum 
wanted to manipulate the canal in order to benefit Northern Sudan, making 
the rest of Sudan a low priority. Similarly, Garang argued that Nimeiri pro-
moted an Arab nationalism that showed exorbitant partiality to Arab Muslims 
in Sudan. The full extension of this nationalism is seen in the implementation 
of the “September Laws” of 1983, which obliged all Sudanese to abide by Is-
lamic Shari’a law.11 Ultimately, in Garang’s perspective Nimeirism is a practice 
of governance that keeps power in the hands of a few (Arab Northern elites) at 
the expense of the masses.12 It is also inherently divisive and does not promote 
unity among the many different ethnic groups of Sudan, but is exploitive and 
oppressive.
In following James Gelvin’s argument about nationalism, we can con-
clude that Garang’s nationalist ideology was formed in response to Arab and 
Islamic nationalist agendas in Sudan. Gelvin articulates that “all nationalisms 
arise in opposition to some ‘other’” and that they are “defined by what they 
oppose.”13 Sudanism is defined as the enemy of sectarian nationalisms, of 
models of dictatorial rule such as Nimeirism, and of secessionism as we will 
see later. Garang struggled against nationalist ideologies that sought to fetter 
diverse Sudanese peoples to strictly Arab, African, Christian, or Islamic identi-
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ties. Sudanism is among the many nationalist ideologies that “defined itself by 
what it opposed.”
Nimeirism is the face of “sectarian chauvinism” and “religious bigotry.”14 
According to Garang it created and perpetuated the suffering of Sudanese 
civilians. Sudanism is the antithesis of Nimeirism, and it also contends against 
separatism and heralds the unity of all Sudanese of every race, gender, religion, 
and ethnicity. It recognizes that Sudan’s identity can be self-defined and estab-
lished by the people. 
In commenting on the formation of nation-states Garang said that the 
British went to America and formed a new nation, and although Americans 
have British origins they do not claim to be British, but American.15 He also 
argued that “Argentineans speak Spanish and are Christians, but they are Ar-
gentineans not Spaniards and are proud of being Argentineans.”16 His point 
was that Sudan can create its own “unique Sudanese civilization” or a “New 
Sudan.”17 By asserting that Sudan can found its own national identity, Ga-
rang confirms Gelvin’s argument that nationalist movements create nations.18 
Nationalist movements do not bring “preexisting nations to a state of self-
awareness,” but they are the authors of their own, “imagined” nation-states.19 
Garang elaborates on the problems in Sudan that are addressed in Su-
danism and says that Sudan has “over 400 different ethnic groups” and that 
although it is a “multi-nationality country” the Khartoum governments since 
1956 have “treated the Sudan as a mono-nationality.”20 He further expounds 
that Sudan is a multi-religious country, but Khartoum governments “favor 
one religion, Islam,” which is fully expressed in the imposition of Shari’a law.21 
According to Garang “nobody is anybody’s minority and nobody is anybody’s 
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majority. We are all Sudanese, full stop.”22 He believed that the union of Su-
dan’s numerous ethnicities, cultures, and religions eliminated the concept of 
a minority. Everyone had equal representation and everyone was a majority. 
From this perspective there was no “southern problem,” because if there was a 
problem for anyone in Sudan, no matter what region, then it was the problem 
of all Sudanese. Garang’s Sudanism arduously struggled to create a New Sudan 
“in which all nationalities and all religious groups coexisted.” Arabs, Africans, 
Christians, Muslims, Dinka, and Nuer are all united under Sudanism, and 
none is valued above the other.24 The unity of diverse people groups is fun-
damental to Sudanism. Garang could have given his alliance to a southern-
Sudanese nationalism, or a Dinka nationalism, or something of the like, but 
he did not offer such submission. This makes his nationalist ideology peculiar 
and distinguishable from other ideologies in Sudan.
It is especially peculiar when analyzed in juxtaposition to Gelvin’s argu-
ment about Zionism and Jewish nationalism. Gelvin claims that Jews needed 
their own “homeland” as a result of the anti-Semitism that they faced in Eu-
rope and Russia, and that Zionism called for Jews around the world to “em-
brace the idea that they constitute a single nation, united as in the case of all 
nations, by the ties and travails of history.”25 Garang was categorized as a black 
“African” from the Dinka ethnic group. In recent history Africans have been 
marginalized and categorized as inferior to other ethnic groups such as Arabs 
and Europeans. Zionism is, in part, formed in response to Jewish marginaliza-
tion and exclusion. However, unlike Zionism, Garang’s nationalist ideology 
did not seek to unite all “Africans,” but included all peoples within the Suda-
nese territory, including Arabs. Zionism does not do this, but instead unites 
all Jews, observant and nonobservant alike. It does not invite other non-Jewish 
people groups to be a part of its nation. This is what makes Sudanism distinct 
from other more universal nationalist ideologies such as Arabism and Zion-
ism. It is very much its own in that it sought to unite many different people 
22 Garang, “Response of John Garang to Dr. El-Gizouli, 1 September 1985,” in Khalid Call 
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groups within Sudan, and to include even those of the Arab ruling elites who 
had historically sought to unite Sudan according to Arabism in a discrimina-
tory way.
ORIGINS OF SUDANISM
In Sudan’s history we can trace the overt progression of the Arab/Islamic iden-
tity, and the gradual neglect and exclusion of the south. Garang recognized 
that the current racial disparities and class distinctions between northern Ar-
abs and southern Africans were a result of historical development. The current 
divisions between Arabs and everyone else in Sudan took centuries to come 
to fruition, and have firm historical roots. Francis M. Deng, a former UN 
Secretary General for internally-displaced persons and an expert on Sudan, 
suggests that Anglo-Egyptian colonial policy in Sudan exacerbated these divi-
sions, and that ultimately, these divisions led to the first civil war in Sudan in 
the 1950s.26 Garang took up arms against an unyielding division between the 
north and the south with his vision for a united Sudan. He claimed that “since 
[independence] a small parasitic clique from the pre-independence system of 
exploitation took over the former instruments of oppression for their own 
interests and against the wishes of the majority of the Sudanese people.”27
Garang points out a “neo-colonialism” at work in Sudan that had ad-
opted the oppressive policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in 
the form of a “domestic colonialism.”28 He used Sudanism as an opposing 
force against the colonial legacy left by the Anglo-Egyptians and against the 
domestic colonialism of the northern Arabs. The development of the Suda-
nese identity under the “Arab hegemony” was quite apparent to Garang. He 
conceded that Sudan’s “major problem was that it had been looking and was 
still looking for its soul, for its true identity.”29 Therefore, Garang offered a 
new identity for Sudan that did not promote the exploitation or discrimina-
26 Deng, 134..
27 “Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People,” Text of appeal, with introduction Radio 
SPLA in English (1300 gmt 10 Nov 84), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4 The Middle 
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tion of any races, ethnicities, or religions. Sudanism is adamant about equality 
because Sudanese history has constantly witnessed the aggrandizement of the 
Arab race alongside the exploitation and neglect of other races, especially of 
southern Africans. It is peculiar that Garang should seek to unite two groups 
of people who had become so blatantly dichotomized. The Arab-African divi-
sion has grown worse over many centuries, along with the development of the 
Arab ruling elite in the north who have neglected the southern Sudanese. This 
should cause us to wonder why Garang did not initially support a national-
ist ideology that favored separatism and self-determination for the southern 
Sudanese.
Garang’s response to this was that “the oppressor,” which represented 
any ruling party or person in the Sudan that had oppressed and exploited the 
masses, had “time and again played various politics in order to destroy and 
weaken the just struggle of our people, including that most historic policy of 
divide and rule.”30 It is clear that Garang judged secessionism as a perpetu-
ation of divisiveness in Sudan that had only served to weaken the Sudanese 
people, not empower them. Garang clearly articulated this view when he said 
that “it was therefore natural that secessionist movements…developed in dif-
ferent periods in different areas of Sudan thereby jeopardizing the unity of the 
people and prolonging their suffering and struggle.”31 Secessionism is a mani-
festation of the inherent “divide and rule” tactics of the oppressor. It does not 
help the cause for peace and prosperity of the exploited Sudanese, but actually 
weakens their struggle and “prolongs their suffering.”32
Garang heralded a nationalist ideology that opposed secessionism with 
the same zeal as it opposed the minority clique regimes. He made this undeni-
ably clear when he said that “if anybody wants to separate even in the north, 
we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It should not be allowed to 
disintegrate or fragment itself.”33 He describes Sudanese unity as something 
to be achieved within a piece of real estate that we call Sudan, but that has 
territorial boundaries delineated by the British. Using Gelvin’s model, clearly 
30 “Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People.”
31 Ibid., 19.
32 Garang, “Speech by John Garang, 3 March 1984,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 22.
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Garang was “inventing the notion that a population used to exist” in Sudan 
that had a “common interest” and that this united population should not be 
allowed to “fragment itself.”34 Garang’s commitment to the unity of the in-
vented Sudanese “nation” was ceaseless. Sudanism has absolutely no tolerance 
for secessionism of any kind. Both minority clique regimes, which are embod-
ied by Nimeirism, and secessionism are enemies of Sudanism.
SOUTHERN SEPARATISTS VERSUS GARANG AND SUDANISM
Garang’s unyielding determination for Sudanese unity, and his intolerance 
of secessionism, galvanized much factionalism among the SPLA leaders and 
other southern Sudanese. The SPLA-Nasir faction was a prominent, southern 
rebel faction among others that opposed Garang’s SPLA/M on ideological 
grounds. The Nasir faction was formed in August of 1991 when two former 
members of the High Command of the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, 
issued a radio message that called for the removal of Garang from leadership.35 
Initially Machar and Akol blamed their defection from the SPLA/M on the 
dictatorial leadership of Garang,36 and on the accusation that Garang commit-
ted countless human rights abuses against SPLA/M members.37 However, on 
January 24, 1992, the SPLA/M Nasir faction expressed their goals for south-
ern self-determination and the separation of the south from the north.38 The 
Nasir faction did not endorse Sudanism, and saw the hope for a united Sudan 
as unrealistic.39 Issues of ideology were fundamental to factional movements 
against the SPLA/M.
At a delegation between Lam Akol and the Nasir faction with the Ni-
gerian Government, it was proposed that “secession is the will of the South-
ern people and Garang knows this very well.” It was concluded that Garang’s 
movement was “doomed” because it did not reflect the goals and “aspirations” 
of the southern people.41 There was a real fervency against Garang’s mission 
34 Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 17.
35 Dr. Lam Akol, SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2003), 12.
36 Ibid., 306.
37 Ibid., 312.
38 Ibid., 332-3.
39 Ibid., 332.
40 Ibid., 70.
41 Ibid.
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for a united Sudan based on Sudanism. We see bold condemnation of Ga-
rang’s nationalist ideology, and claims against him that said he was not rep-
resenting the will of the people, but was instead promoting a self-interested 
agenda. According to Gelvin, this would invalidate Sudanism because in this 
instance it would not reflect the “common interest” of the people whom it was 
attempting to unite.42 Garang faced much opposition from southern separat-
ists, which resulted in manifold human rights violations and the slaughter of 
innocent civilians by all parties involved. Sudanism could not co-exist with 
separatist ideologies, and this is reflected in the violent conflict between Ga-
rang’s SPLA/M, the Nasir faction and other southern factions.
There are claims against Garang’s unity stance, as mentioned earlier, that 
posit that the sentiment of the southern people was for secession and self-de-
termination. Therefore, separatists concluded that Garang was not fighting for 
the “common interest” of the Sudanese people. In the 1990s, there was much 
pressure put on Garang to renounce his position for a united Sudan, and to 
concede to self-determination and secession for the South. This would have 
inevitably forfeited the implementation of Sudanism. Scholars tend to agree 
that the unity policy was important for causing factionalism.43 Further, there 
is overwhelming unanimity among scholars regarding the southern sentiment 
toward secession. Most acknowledge that the majority of southerners favored 
secession rather than a united Sudan, and that they fought under Garang 
with this underlying sentiment in their hearts.44 Obviously Lam Akol agreed 
with scholars and claimed that the “Southern Sudanese received the call for a 
United Sudan with great skepticism and finally total rejection.”45
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There is a strong case to be made for this reality, because it is hard to 
understand why there was so much factionalism and internal, violent south-
ern conflict unless Garang was, in fact, not representing the political goals 
and hopes of the southern Sudanese people. Although Garang claimed to be 
fighting on behalf of all of Sudan, not just the south, it is important to men-
tion the south because this is the group that has faced much of the historical 
exploitation by the north. The south comprises many of the oppressed peoples 
for whose liberation Garang claimed to fight. Therefore, if Garang did not 
represent the sentiment of the southern people then his movement was not for 
the “common good” of all. Obviously there were other reasons that fueled and 
perpetuated southern factional conflict, but ideology played a prominent role. 
Ultimately, if Sudanism did not reflect the majority sentiment of the 
marginalized people of Sudan, then it seems that it was a self-interested na-
tionalist ideology. It was not a valid nationalism according to Gelvin if it did 
not reflect the “common interest” of the Sudanese populace. Sudanism was 
not a legitimate movement of liberation if it was only favorable to one ethnic 
group in Sudan. It was futile and unreflective of southern aspirations if the 
“excluded” people of Sudan favored secessionism, and not unity.
SOUTHERN SENTIMENT: UNITY OR SECESSION?
It is difficult to attach a specific figure to the southern will for secession during 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, the true, contemporary southern sentiment 
regarding secession was recently unveiled in the referendum vote in Janu-
ary 2011. The final count showed that of the 3.8 million registered voters in 
southern Sudan, 98.83% voted in favor of seceding from the north.46 There 
is overwhelming unanimity in favor of secession in the south, which causes 
us to question Garang’s commitment to the “common interests” of the south-
ern Sudanese. Garang was an out-spoken opponent of secession, and in this 
regard he was in disagreement with most of the people for whom he claimed 
to fight. The southern sentiment for secession may have been strong during 
the Garangian era, but at that time it was not a point of enough contention 
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to oust Garang from his position of Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA/M. 
Despite what may have been unanimous secessionist sentiments, Garang re-
mained consistent and persistent with his goals for a united New Sudan, while 
Riek Machar and Lam Akol seem to have compromised their objectives and 
the objectives of liberation for the southern Sudanese.
In a radio message to all units of the SPLA on August 28th, 1991, 
Machar and Akol spoke untruthfully when they claimed that Garang had 
been “deposed” as the Chairman of the SPLA/M and that Riek Machar would 
“take over as the interim leader until a National Convention was called to elect 
the leader of the Movement.”47 The reality is that Garang was not deposed and 
that he remained the leader of the SPLA/M. Machar and Akol’s declaration 
against Garang did result in the creation of a new southern faction and did 
have some popularity, but it did not have the restructuring effect for which 
they had hoped. Secession was not an issue of such importance at that time 
that it was cause for Garang’s removal. Even though Garang was not deposed, 
we cannot neglect the fact that Garang did not seem to reflect the “common 
interest” of the southern people with regard to secession. This further confirms 
the peculiarity of Sudanism, and causes us to question Garang’s unyielding 
commitment to unity when so many of his followers advocated separation. 
Nonetheless, the secessionist will of the Nasir faction was not strong enough 
to overthrow Garang even though it weakened the movement by resulting 
in brutal conflict between southern factions and in the wanton slaughter of 
thousands of civilians.
After unsuccessfully attempting to overthrow Garang, Machar and Akol 
began to collude with the Khartoum government and received government 
military support to combat Garang’s SPLA-Torit.48 The government also 
sponsored other anti-Garang groups such as the Anyanya II and Arab militias 
militarily in order to weaken Garang’s movement.49 The Nasir faction, the 
Anyanya II movement, and the Arab militias such as the Murhallin, all com-
mitted inhumane atrocities against Sudanese civilians, especially against the 
47 Akol, 12.
48 SPLA-Torit is another name given to Garang’s faction of the SPLA Movement. Sam Kiley, 
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Dinka.50 One of the most notorious acts of atrocious violence against civilians 
by government-sponsored Arab militias was the massacre of approximately 
1,500 Dinka civilians in the town of Al-Daein in 1987.51 Amnesty Interna-
tional accused Machar’s Nasir faction in 1993 of killing approximately 2,000 
Dinka.52
Garang’s SPLA also had a record of human rights abuses, although it 
was less egregious than that of the government-funded southern factions and 
militias. I point out the atrocities of the Nasir faction in order to show that 
Machar and Akol initially opposed Garang because of his dictatorial and in-
humane leadership, and because he did not support the true secessionist goals 
of the Sudanese masses.
Yet, soon after its origin, the Nasir faction began receiving military 
support from the government, and then committed heinous human rights 
abuses against southern Sudanese civilians. The Nasir faction especially tar-
geted Dinka civilians because of their association with Garang, who was also 
a Dinka and had been accused by some as leading a movement that was seek-
ing Sudanese domination by the Dinka.53 Dinka civilians were also targeted 
by the Arab militias employed by the government, as is seen in the Al-Daein 
massacre of 1987.
Why is it that the Nasir faction claimed to fight on behalf of the seces-
sionist sentiments of southerners and their liberation, but also colluded with 
an oppressive government and massacred Dinka civilians?  Were the Dinka 
people so unanimously pro-Garang that the Nasir faction felt it necessary 
to slaughter them in order to accomplish secessionist goals for the suffering 
Sudanese?
Machar’s Nasir faction was not alone in its human rights abuses. Ga-
rang’s SPLA also committed its share of human rights violations against suf-
fering Sudanese civilians and dissenters within the SPLA, which obviously 
50 Human Rights Watch Report/Africa (formerly Africa Watch), Civilian Devastation: Abuses 
by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 1994), 90, 
94, 95.
51 “Police Aided in Massacre, Sudanese Survivors Say,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), April, 
25, 1987.
52 Robert M. Press, “Civil War Hurts Sudan’s Civilians,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, 
MA), July 23, 1993.
53 Hutchinson, “A Curse from God,” 308.
the forum
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54 Human Rights Watch Report/Africa 1994, 3.
55 Hutchinson, “A Curse from God,” 310; Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok, 130; Sam Kiley, 
“Khartoum Supplying Guns to Inflame Rebel Infighting.”  The southern faction led by Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol was referred to as the “Nasir” faction, and John Garang’s movement was 
referred to as the “Torit” faction. Khartoum gave military support to the Nasir faction in order to 
weaken Garang’s movement.
perpetuated the conflict between the Nasir faction and Garang.54 However, if 
the oppressed people of Sudan were so anti-Garang and so pro-secession, then 
the Nasir faction would not have needed to garner abundant military support 
from the “minority clique regime” and massacre civilians in order to defeat 
Garang. There may have been substantial pro-secessionist aspirations among 
the southern Sudanese, but anti-Garang sentiments were not as prominent 
as Machar and Akol had claimed. This does not mean that Garang reflected 
the majority sentiment of the marginalized Sudanese, but it does mean that 
he had enough support to remain the leader of the dominant rebel army in 
Sudan.
There were two reasons for the collusion of the Nasir faction with the 
Khartoum government. The first is that the Nasir faction lacked the resources 
and the popularity to overthrow Garang, and therefore had to acquire govern-
ment support. Secondly, as is widely accepted, the Khartoum government 
continually instigated Nasir-Torit conflict and used the Nasir faction to weak-
en the whole Sudanese rebel movement.55 This confirms Garang’s theory that 
the “oppressor” constantly sought to “divide and rule” the Sudanese people to 
their demise. The government supported the Nasir faction in order to divide 
and subjugate the whole rebel cause. Garang must have despised the Nasir 
faction’s adultery against the Sudanese people as they slept with the enemy in 
Khartoum.
Ultimately, we can, at the very least, conclude that Garang was fervent 
and unyielding in his pursuit of Sudanism. While adamant secessionists such 
as Machar and Akol compromised their own objectives and colluded with the 
“oppressor” to the detriment of countless civilians, Garang remained consis-
tent about achieving a new, united Sudan that was democratic and that did 
not discriminate based on race, religion, or culture, and that redefined the 
Sudanese identity. However, Garang’s hope for a united Sudan could not suc-
ceed in the midst of overwhelming support for secession among southerners.
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CONCLUSION
Using James L. Gelvin’s argument about nationalist ideologies, which claims 
that nations are created by nationalists and that nationalisms must promote 
the “common interest” of the populations of the nations they create, we have 
traced the development of John Garang’s nationalist ideology, Sudanism. It 
is defined in opposition to Garang’s idea of Nimeirism, which is an ideology 
that does not include the “excluded” and that does not unite all of the ethnic 
groups, religions, and cultures within the territorial boundaries of Sudan. Su-
danism also opposes secessionism much in the same way that Zionism oppos-
es dissension among Jews who refute the idea of global Jewish unity. Garang 
remained consistent and persistent in his pursuit of his nationalist agenda, and 
hoped for a united Sudan and for a new, distinctly Sudanese identity.
To the great tragedy of those who shared Garang’s optimism, and who 
trusted in him to implement a viable peace for the “excluded” Sudanese, Ga-
rang was killed in a helicopter crash on a flight from Uganda to southern 
Sudan on the weekend of July 31, 2005.56 The excluded people of Sudan have 
spoken, and it seems that Sudanism and the hope for a united Sudan has 
perished with Garang. The true sentiment of the southern Sudanese people 
is for secession, and in this current era it seems doubtful that Sudanism will 
ever be realized. Even if Sudanism did not reflect the secessionist interests of 
the southern peoples, we are still left to wonder if Dr. John Garang de Mabior 
pushed down the monster’s body, the body of Nimeirism, or if the monster 
still stands. Is the monster falling down or is it lifting itself up, only to ruin 
the hope of Sudan?  It is the people who removed the monster’s head in the 
first place, and it will be the people who decide what becomes of its body. Su-
danism, in its entirety, will not be the sword with which Nimeirism is perma-
nently slain, but whatever the sword may be, it will be the people who wield it. 
May they wield this sword in unity and “dig out a mountain with shovels!”57 
56 Marc Lacey, “New No. 2 in Sudan, an Ex-Rebel Leader, Dies in a Copter Crash,” New York 
Times, Aug. 1, 2005.
57 Quote by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985 on Second Anniversary of the Bor, Pibor 
and Fashalla resistance and Ayod revolt. It is meant to signify the power of Sudanese unity. He 
says “all reactionary and clique regimes in Khartoum must know that when the people are united 
and resolved they can dig out a mountain with shovels, let alone the May II regime with is much 
weaker than May I.”; Garang, “Statement by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985” in Khalid 
Call for Democracy, 52.
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